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Abstract. Most SSL/TLS-based electronic commerce (e-commerce) ap-
plications (including Internet banking) are vulnerable to man in the mid-
dle attacks. Such attacks arise since users are often unable to authenticate
a server effectively, and because user authentication methods are typi-
cally decoupled from SSL/TLS session establishment. Cryptographically
binding the two authentication procedures together, a process referred
to here as SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication (TLS-SA), is a
lightweight and effective countermeasure. In this paper we propose a
means of implementing TLS-SA using a GAA bootstrapped key. The
scheme employs a GAA-enabled user device with a display and an input
capability (e.g. a 3G mobile phone) and a GAA-aware server. We describe
a simple instantiation of the scheme which makes the password authen-
tication mechanism SSL/TLS session-aware; in addition we describe two
possible variants that give security-efficiency trade-offs. Analysis shows
that the scheme is effective, secure and scalable. Moreover, the approach
fits well to the multi-institution scenario.
Keywords: man in the middle, SSL/TLS session-aware user authenti-
cation, Generic Authentication Architecture
1 Introduction
Most current e-commerce applications (including Internet banking) employ the
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) [12] or the Transport Layer Security (TLS) proto-
col1 [9] to cryptographically protect the communication channel between the
? The author is a PhD student at the South China University of Technology. This work
was performed during a visit to the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway,
University of London, sponsored by the Chinese Scholarship Council and the Natural
Science Foundation of Guangdong Province, China (No. 9351064101000003).
1 The minor differences between SSL and TLS are not relevant here, and we thus refer
to them jointly as SSL/TLS throughout.
2 Chunhua Chen et al.
client and the server. Typically, when establishing the SSL/TLS session, the
server authenticates itself to the client using a public key certificate. Although
the client could also authenticate itself to the server using a public key certificate
(an option in the SSL/TLS protocol), in practice this rarely takes place since very
few clients have the necessary key pair and certificate [19]. Instead, SSL/TLS-
based applications typically employ a separate user authentication protocol on
top of SSL/TLS, e.g. using a password, personal identification number (PIN),
or a more sophisticated mechanism such as a one-time password system.
The SSL/TLS protocol appears reasonably sound, and the security issues so
far identified [20, 26] appear to be relatively minor. However, in practice, the
SSL/TLS protocol does not provide a high level of security because it requires
the user to verify with whom the client system is communicating, a task that is
often poorly performed [8]. Man in the middle attacks arise precisely because of
this shortcoming and the fact that the user authentication process is decoupled
from SSL/TLS session establishment. Consequently, any effective countermea-
sure against these man in the middle attacks in an SSL/TLS setting must either
enforce proper server authentication or combine the user authentication pro-
cess with SSL/TLS session establishment. Oppliger et al. [23, 25] introduced the
term SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication (TLS-SA) to describe the latter
countermeasure, and proposed an approach of this type using a non-user-specific
hardware token that shares a secret key with the server. However, this pre-shared
key based approach has a number of disadvantages (see also section 3).
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) networks have been
widely deployed, and there are a huge number of subscription holders across
the world. The Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) [3] exploits the
UMTS authentication infrastructure to enable the provision of security services,
including key establishment, to third party mobile and Internet applications.
In essence, GAA makes use of the UMTS Authentication and Key Agreement
(UMTS AKA) protocol [2] to bootstrap application-specific session keys between
GAA-enabled devices and GAA-aware servers.
To avoid the disadvantages of the pre-shared key based approach, we propose
a means of implementing TLS-SA using a GAA bootstrapped key. The scheme
employs a GAA-enabled user device with a display and an input capability (e.g.
a 3G mobile phone) and a GAA-aware server, and binds the user authentication
process to the TLS session without modifying the operation of TLS. Analysis
shows that the scheme is effective, secure, scalable and has a degree of flexi-
bility enabling security-efficiency trade-offs. Moreover, the approach fits well to
the multi-institution scenario. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In
section 2 we describe relevant background. In section 3 we survey related work
with an emphasis on TLS-SA. In section 4 we propose the GAA-based approach,
and also describe two possible variants that give security-efficiency trade-offs. In
section 5 we present a security analysis, and in section 6 we draw conclusions.
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2 Background
In this section we briefly describe the man in the middle attacks relevant to
SSL/TLS-based applications, as well as relevant details of UMTS AKA and
GAA.
2.1 Man in the Middle Attacks
A man in the middle attack targets associations between communicating entities.
Typically, an adversary places itself between the client and the server and estab-
lishes separate associations with them. It then intercepts and selectively modifies
communicated data to masquerade as the legitimate entities. Cryptographic pro-
tection does not in itself prevent such an attack, because the adversary engages
in association establishment and possesses all the negotiated cryptographic keys.
We assume the following SSL/TLS setting in this paper:
1. the SSL/TLS protocol is only used to authenticate the server, and
2. user authentication is performed using username and password via an estab-
lished SSL/TLS session.
When establishing the SSL/TLS tunnel, the user should verify the identity of the
remote system with which the client system (e.g. a browser) is communicating.
If not, then certain man in the middle attacks become possible.
Some classes of phishing attacks are examples of such man in the middle
attacks, and attacks of this type have become widespread [1]. In these attacks,
an adversary sets up a fake web site which imitates an existing legitimate site
in order to mislead users and obtain their authentication credentials. Dhamija
et al. [8] show that users often cannot distinguish a legitimate web site from a
fake (including in the case where SSL/TLS server authentication is employed).
Against this background, and as discussed by Oppliger et al. [23], most cur-
rently deployed user authentication mechanisms fail to provide effective protec-
tion against man in the middle attacks, even when they run over the SSL/TLS
protocol. There are two main reasons for this.
1. Verifying the identity of the SSL/TLS-authenticated server is usually done
poorly by na¨ıve end users, if at all.
2. SSL/TLS session establishment is usually decoupled from user authentica-
tion.
If both the above assumptions hold, an attacker can first establish a SSL/TLS
session with the client, and fool the user into revealing his or her credentials.
The attacker then establishes a separate SSL/TLS session with the server it
has impersonated, and masquerades as the user by retransmitting the stolen
credentials. Defeating this man in the middle attack requires either proper server
authentication or a means of combining the user authentication process with
SSL/TLS session establishment.
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2.2 Generic Authentication Architecture
The information in this section is mainly derived from Holtmanns et al. [14].
The UMTS AKA protocol provides authentication and key establishment
using a long-term secret subscriber key (K ), shared by a user device (e.g. a 3G
mobile phone) and a mobile network. After a successful UMTS AKA procedure,
a pair of secret session keys is established which are shared by the device and
the network. The established keys are CK, used for confidentiality protection,
and IK, used for integrity protection. We note also that, in the UMTS AKA
procedure, a random challenge (RAND) is sent by the mobile network to the
user device.
The Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA) [3] has been standardised
by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP), and its North American
counterpart, the 3rd Generation Partnership Project 2 (3GPP2). The 3GPP
standard versions of GAA build on the widely established mobile authentication
infrastructures (including the GSM and UMTS infrastructures). In this paper we
focus on GAA as supported by the UMTS authentication infrastructure. GAA
consists of two procedures: GAA bootstrapping and Use of bootstrapped keys.
GAA bootstrapping, also known as the Generic Bootstrapping Architecture
(GBA), is the process by which UMTS AKA is used to set up a GAA master
session key (MK ) between a GAA-enabled device and a network, where MK is
the concatenation of IK and CK . The network also sends a transaction identifier
B-TID . B-TID is generated from the RAND value and the network domain name
of the mobile network, and can be used to identify MK and its lifetime to the
GAA-enabled device. Both the GAA-enabled device and the network cache MK,
the lifetime of MK and RAND for later use. The master session key MK is not
bound to a particular application, and can only be used to derive application-
specific session keys.
Use of bootstrapped keys is the procedure by which a GAA-enabled device
employs the bootstrapped keys to secure its exchanges in an application protocol
with a particular GAA-aware application server. Once the GAA-enabled device
decides to engage in an application protocol with a particular GAA-aware server,
it derives an application-specific session key (SK ) from MK, as follows:
SK = KDF(MK ,GBAvariant,RAND , IMPI,NAF -Id)
where KDF is a key derivation function, GBA variant indicates the bootstrap-
ping variant (such as GBA ME or GBA U), the IP Multimedia Private Identifier
(IMPI) is derived from the International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) [6]
which is unique to each mobile phone, and NAF-Id2 is an application-specific
value consisting of the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) of an applica-
tion server and the identifier of the underlying application protocol. The device
starts the application protocol by sending a request containing B-TID . The
server fetches the same SK, the lifetime of SK, and other relevant information
2 In the GAA specifications [3], the functionality of a GAA-aware application server
is referred to as the Network Application Function (NAF).
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from the corresponding mobile network by forwarding the received B-TID and
its own identifier NAF-Id. Note that B-TID contains the network domain name
of the mobile network, so the application server knows where to send the request.
Normally the network has to authenticate that the requesting server is the gen-
uine owner of FQDN, which forms a part of NAF-Id. In GAA, it is assumed that
a confidential and authenticated channel between the server and the network
has been set up by some means. At this point, the device and the server share
the same value of SK . It is important to note that SK is bound to a specific
application protocol and a particular application server.
In summary, UMTS GAA uses UMTS AKA to bootstrap application-specific
session keys between GAA-enabled devices and GAA-aware servers.
3 Related Work
The incorporation of password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) schemes into
the TLS protocol has been proposed by Steiner et al. [27] and, subsequently, by
Abdalla et al. [7]. More recently, the use of the Secure Remote Password (SRP)
protocol within TLS has been specified in an Internet draft [28]. Despite the
potential advantages of such an approach, migrating from legacy user authen-
tication to a PAKE-based system is non-trivial for a variety of technical and
business reasons [10].
An application of GAA based on Pre-Shared Key (PSK) TLS [11] has been
described in 3GPP documents [4, 5]. GAA credentials are used to establish a
TLS session by setting the Pre-Shared Key identity to be the B-TID, and the
PSK to be the application-specific session key. Note the PSK TLS protocol is
able to protect against man in the middle attacks.
Oppliger et al. [23] introduced SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication
(TLS-SA), a lightweight and effective countermeasure [24] to man in the middle
attacks. TLS-SA makes user authentication depend not only on the user’s secret
credentials, such as his or her password, but also on SSL/TLS session state
information. As a result, the server can check whether or not the SSL/TLS
session in which it receives the credentials matches the one employed by the user
to send them. If the two sessions match, it is unlikely that a man in the middle
is involved; however, if they differ, something abnormal must be taking place,
e.g. a man in the middle attack is being performed.
TLS-SA is not a user authentication mechanism or system. Many different
approaches can be used to make a given authentication mechanism SSL/TLS
session-aware and hence resistant to man in the middle attacks. Oppliger et al.
[23] proposed a pre-shared key based approach, and subsequently described a
proof of concept implementation [25]. This scheme involves a hardware authen-
tication token which shares a secret key with the server.
One disadvantage of this pre-shared key based approach is that every server
needs to generate and securely distribute a key-bearing token to every user, which
is likely to be a significant burden in practice. Another disadvantage is its poor
scalability. A subsequent proposal [24] involves the use of a multi-institution
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token which is equipped with a separate secret key for each of a number of
servers; however such a scheme may be difficult to market.
4 TLS-SA Using a GAA Bootstrapped Key
We now propose a means of implementing TLS-SA using a GAA bootstrapped
key. The scheme employs a GAA-enabled user device with a display and an input
capability (e.g. a 3G mobile phone) and a GAA-aware server. During the user
authentication process, an application-specific session key (SK ) is bootstrapped
between the device and the server using GAA. The device uses this GAA boot-
strapped key to compute a user authentication code from a combination of the
user’s secret credentials and state information for the current SSL/TLS session.
The user authentication code is submitted to the server to authenticate the user,
instead of the secret credentials. It is important to observe that, unlike previously
proposed TLS-SA schemes, the system we describe does not require an initial-
isation process. That is, the GAA-enabled mobile device is not user or server
specific, and can be used in the protocol with no registration or configuration
(except for the installation of the necessary application software).
The state information to be used in the computation of user authentication
code must have the following properties: (1) it must be shared by the client
and the server and be distinct for every SSL/TLS session, and (2) the state
information established by a server operated by a man in the middle attacker
must be different from the value established by the genuine server. In the scheme
described below, this is achieved by using as state information a hash of all
the messages exchanged during the underlying SSL/TLS Handshake, computed
using a suitable cryptographic hash function.
In the remainder of this section we first describe a simple instantiation of
the scheme. We then discuss two possible variants that give security-efficiency
trade-offs.
4.1 The Basic Scheme
The following entities play a role in the scheme:
– A user U .
– A SSL/TLS-enabled and GAA-aware server S . We assume that the applica-
tion supporting the scheme and executing in S can access certain elements
of the SSL/TLS session information.
– A SSL/TLS-enabled client (e.g. a browser) C, used by U to access S. We
assume that an application supporting the scheme has been installed in C
(e.g. as a Java applet/browser plug-in). This application must have ability to
access certain elements of the client’s SSL/TLS session information and be
aware of the FQDN of the underlying S and the identifier of the underlying
application protocol.
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– A GAA-enabled user device T (e.g. a 3G mobile phone) with a display and
an input capability. We assume that an application supporting the scheme
has been installed in T . This application must possess a means of communi-
cation with the scheme-specific application in C in order to get the necessary
information, e.g. as provided by a USB cable or a Bluetooth link.
– A mobile network provider N that provides the GAA service, and that is
trusted by users and servers.
These entities are equipped with various parameters and cryptographic keys. U
is equipped with an identifier username and a password (pw), a secret shared
with S . A long-term secret subscriber key (K ) is shared by T (strictly its USIM)
and its home mobile network as part of the subscription. Note that we also
assume that S has the means to establish a secure authenticated channel (e.g.
as provided by an SSL/TLS tunnel) with a mobile network as necessary to use
GAA.
1. C ↔ S : establish an SSL/TLS session,
: and generate H .
2. T ↔ N : B-TID, MK, RAND
: and the lifetime of MK ([Tstart, Tend]).
3. C → T : H, the FQDN of S, and the identifier
: of the application protocol.
4. T : derives a session key SK.
5. T : computes uac = f(H ,SK , pw , . . .).
6. U(C) → S : B-TID, username, and auc.
7. S ↔ N : SK and the lifetime of SK ([Tstart, Tend]).
8. S : Tcurrent ∈ [Tstart, Tend]?
: if so, S recomputes auc for authentication;
: if not, S discards the request.
Figure 1: the GAA-based TLS-SA protocol
Figure 1 summarises the GAA-based TLS-SA protocol. We next give a more
detailed description, referring to the step numbers shown in the figure.
When U wishes to access S, U directs its client C to S . C and S then estab-
lish an SSL/TLS session with server authentication using a public key certificate
(step 1).3 Once the session has been established, C and S compute (and cache)
H = h(Msgs)
where h refers to a suitable cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-1 or one
of the SHA-2 family [21] and Msgs denotes all the messages exchanged within
the SSL/TLS session establishment process.4
3 Whether or not the user verifies that S is indeed the server it wishes to communicate
with is not critical to the security of the scheme.
4 Enabling the application to gain access to these messages may require minor mod-
ifications to the SSL/TLS implementation. However, it requires no change to the
SSL/TLS Handshake protocol itself.
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T next checks whether it has a pre-established and valid master session key
MK . If not, T triggers a GAA bootstrapping procedure with its home network.
After successful execution of this process, the values B-TID, MK, the lifetime of
MK, and RAND are shared and cached by T and its home network (step 2).
U employs T to communicate with the scheme-specific application in C to
get H, the FQDN of S and the identifier of the application protocol (step 3). T
then constructs NAF-Id and derives a session key SK, as described in section 2.2
(step 4). Note that SK is not specific to U, and cannot be used to authenticate
U to S .
After derivation of SK, T uses U ’s password pw (which must be input by
U at some point) to compute a user authentication code uac as a function f of
SK, H, pw, and other relevant parameters (step 5), i.e.
uac = f(SK ||H ||pw || . . .),
where here and throughout || is used to denote concatenation. The function f
can be implemented in many ways. One possibility, which complies with clause
5.1.2 of ISO/IEC 9798-4 [16], is to instantiate f using HMAC [18] based on a
suitable cryptographic hash function, where the various inputs to f are simply
concatenated prior to applying HMAC. In this case, uac is computed as:
uac = HMACSK (H ||pw ||“Client”).
As discussed above, H is an SSL/TLS session-specific value, and it plays the role
of the nonce in the ISO/IEC 9798-4 protocol. The fixed string “Client” plays
the role of the entity identifier.
The server authenticates the user U by asking him or her to submit the
values B-TID, username, and uac using the SSL/TLS-protected channel (step
6). Note that the user is not required to enter these values into the client, since
they can be transferred electronically from T to C . To verify the received uac,
S fetches the same SK, the lifetime of SK, and other relevant information from
T ’s home network using the GAA bootstrapped key usage procedure (step 7).
SK ’s lifetime can be set to be the same as that of MK. Before recomputing uac,
S must check whether or not SK is valid. This is achieved by checking whether
or not the current system time of S is within SK ’s lifetime.5 If not, SK is invalid
and U will be rejected; otherwise, S can now use the received SK to recompute
uac for verification.6 If the recomputed uac and the uac submitted by U match,
U will be granted access (step 8).
Note that the SSL/TLS implementations in C and S need to provide ac-
cess to session information to the application layer [13, 17]. We propose that
the SSL/TLS implementations compute H upon the completion of SSL/TLS
Handshake session establishment, and cache it as part of the connection state
for the SSL/TLS Record layer. However, how this is achieved is application and
SSL/TLS implementation specific, and hence we do not discuss this further here.
5 Note that we assume that the system time of the network and the server are syn-
chronised with each other.
6 S must retrieve H at some point.
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4.2 Variants
In GAA, SK is typically used as a session key to secure application data sent
between client and server. Using SK instead of MK reduces the risk of disclosing
the master key MK, e.g. as a result of cryptanalysis. However, in our case SK is
only used in the computation of the user authentication code, i.e. only a small
amount of data is involved. Other application data is protected by transmission
through an SSL/TLS-protected channel.
Examining the computation of SK (as above), it follows that, during the
lifetime of the key MK, the value of SK only depends on NAF-Id. In practice,
U could repeatedly access a particular server using the same application pro-
tocol.7 In such a case, U would use the same NAF-Id in the derivation of SK
in multiple user authentication sessions. In fact, the GAA bootstrapping pro-
cedure can be avoided after the first use by setting the lifetime of MK to be
sufficiently long. In this case, T uses the same MK in the derivation of SK in all
subsequent authentication sessions, and hence a user can employ the same SK
for all authentication sessions with a particular server which involve a specific
application protocol. As a result, it is reasonable to propose that T and S both
cache SK and use it as a long-term shared key to avoid frequent use of GAA
and derivations of SK . We next describe two variants to achieve this.
In both variants, T and its home network first carry out a GAA bootstrap-
ping procedure to establish a shared master key MK and other information. The
lifetime of MK must be set to be sufficiently long. This process is performed be-
fore any user authentication processes.
A Straightforward Variant The user device T can identify SK using NAF-
Id, which is constructed from the FQDN of S and the identifier of the application
protocol. When computing uac, T first tries to retrieve SK from its cache using
the constructed NAF-Id as index. If SK is not present, then T derives an SK
from MK and the constructed NAF-Id, stores the pair (NAF-Id, SK ), and then
uses the derived SK to compute uac. If SK is in the cache, T uses it directly in
the computation of uac.
The server S needs to use both B-TID and NAF-Id to identify SK . U submits
username, B-TID, and uac in the authentication process. Upon receiving an
authentication request from C, S tries to retrieve SK from its cache using the
received B-TID and its own NAF-Id as index. If SK is not present, S requests
it from T ’s home network, stores the received triple (B-TID, NAF-Id, SK ), and
then verifies the uac to authenticate the user. If SK is present, S uses it directly
in the verification process.
A Separate Registration Procedure Variant In the basic scheme and the
first variant described above, U has to submit username, B-TID, and uac in
order to be authenticated by S . B-TID is submitted so that S can identify
7 For example, the user might repeatedly interact with a browser to access his or her
bank account via HTTPS.
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SK . In a standard password-based user authentication process, only username
and pw need to be submitted. Thus submitting B-TID potentially significantly
increases the traffic load (since B-TID is much longer than a typical password),
and increases the complexity of implementation in settings in which B-TID must
be input by U . In the variant we now describe, S is required to provide a service
which allows U to register SK, enabling S to identify SK from just the username.
As a result, U will only need to submit username and uac in the authentication
process. The registration of SK can be done using a registration procedure of
the type described below.
Before any user authentication process, T derives SK to be used by U to
access a particular server S through a specified application protocol. T stores the
pair (username, SK ). If M = H ||pw , then, in order to register SK, U submits
username, B-TID, and ESK (M ) via a previously established SSL/TLS-protected
channel. Here E is an authenticated encryption technique, e.g. one of those
standardised in ISO/IEC 19772 [15]. Upon receiving the request, S fetches the
same SK, the lifetime of SK and other relevant information from T ’s home
network using the GAA bootstrapped key usage procedure. S can now use the
received SK to decrypt and verify the encrypted version of M to recover H
and pw. S then checks whether the received H matches the current SSL/TLS
session. Finally, S verifies whether username identifies a valid user and pw is the
correct password for this user. If all the verifications succeed, then S registers
the binding between username and SK .
After a successful registration procedure, T and S share the same SK which
can be identified by username. Thus, in the user authentication process, U only
needs to submit username and uac. However, it is important to note that the
binding between U and SK remains weak, and is only useful for the purpose of
identifying SK . That is, successful user authentication will require knowledge of
both SK and pw.
5 Analysis
The GAA-based approach avoids the disadvantages of the pre-shared key ap-
proach discussed in section 3. To implement the GAA-based approach, the user
only needs a GAA-enabled device with a display and an input capability. This
can be implemented using a 3G mobile phone with a valid subscription, and there
are a very large number of subscription holders across the world. The approach
thus has good scalability. Moreover, since a GAA bootstrapped session key is
used in the computation of the user authentication code, there is no need to gen-
erate and securely distribute a key-bearing token to every user. The approach
also fits well to the multi-institution scenario. The system enables server-specific
session keys to be generated using a single GAA-enabled device, where each such
key can be used to help authenticate a user to the appropriate GAA-aware server.
The GAA-enabled device thus acts as a non-institution-specific authentication
token.
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However, in deciding whether to use this GAA-based TLS-SA system, the
server S and its users must trust the mobile network provider not to compromise
its long-term password (see also section 5.1). Such a trust relationship could be
supported by a contractual agreement between application service providers and
mobile operators.
A limitation of the scheme is that use of the system will incur the cost of
using the GAA service. The two variants described in section 4.2 are more cost-
effective in this respect than the basic scheme.
We next give an informal security analysis. We then show that the GAA-
based approach has a degree of flexibility, enabling the implementation of security-
efficiency trade-offs.
5.1 Informal Security Analysis
We consider a threat model in which an attacker A is able to observe and make
arbitrary modifications to messages exchanged between C and S, including re-
playing, blocking and inserting completely spurious messages. This allows a triv-
ial denial of service attack which cannot be prevented. A is also assumed to be
a legitimate user of the UMTS GAA service. However, A is not allows to com-
promise the implementations of T, C or S (e.g. using malware); such attacks on
system integrity are not addressed by the schemes we propose.
The security of the schemes relies on the security of the underlying UMTS
GAA and SSL/TLS protocol. In turn, the security of UMTS GAA is built on
the assumption that learning the subscriber key and/or MK by attacking UMTS
AKA is not possible [14].
We next provide a brief informal analysis of how the schemes meet the in-
tended security goals.
1. Resistance to user authentication code replay.
The GAA-based scheme, like the pre-shared key approach, involves authen-
ticating a user via a user authentication code (uac). The user authentication
code is cryptographically bound to the current SSL/TLS Handshake session
state information. The state information (H ) is a cryptographic hash of all
the messages exchanged during SSL/TLS session establishment.
Suppose A launches a man-in-the-middle attack by establishing two sepa-
rate SSL/TLS sessions: one with S (masquerading as C ) and one with C
(masquerading as S ). The value of the uac provided by C to A will be a
function of the messages exchanged by C and A during SSL/TLS session
establishment; similarly the uac expected by S will be a function of the
messages exchanged by A and S during SSL/TLS session establishment.
Even if they are otherwise identical, the first set of messages will include
A’s SSL/TLS server certificate, and the second set of messages will instead
contains S ’s certificate. As a result the uac provided by C will be different
to that expected by S, and hence the attack will fail.
2. Resistance to compromise of a user password (pw).
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A could set up an SSL/TLS session with C (impersonating a legitimate S )
and request a uac. The uac is computed using a keyed one way hash function
which takes as input the GAA bootstrapped session key; it is thus infeasible
to retrieve pw from a valid uac without knowing this session key. That is, A
cannot succeed in a off-line dictionary attack against pw without knowing
the corresponding SK or MK (using MK, A can derive SK ). Similarly, in
the registration procedure, A cannot retrieve pw from the encrypted string
sent to S without knowing the corresponding SK or MK . We assume that
the underlying UMTS GAA is secure [22], that is, it is impossible for A to
learn SK (intended for a legitimate S ) or MK established between T and
its mobile network by attacking UMTS GAA.
Alternatively, A could attack the KDF algorithm used for SK derivation. In
such an attack, A chooses and registers a value for NAF-Id (NAF-IdA, say)
which has the property that
KDF(MK ,GBAvariant,RAND , IMPI,NAF -
IdA) = KDF(MK ,GBAvariant,RAND , IMPI,NAF -IdS)
for any master key MK, where NAF-IdS is the NAF-Id for a legitimate server
S . A then requests an SK from the mobile network by sending B-TID and
NAF-IdA. The mobile network derives an SK from NAF-IdA, which is equal
to the SK derived from NAF-IdS . As a result, the adversary learns the value
of SK for U and S . However, the KDF algorithm used in GAA is based
on HMAC-SHA-256, which is believed to be a secure MAC function [14],
and hence such a collision attack is believed to be infeasible. The choice of
a cryptographically strong KDF also means that even if A has discovered
a number of SK values, they cannot be used to discover other keys derived
from the same master key MK .
3. Resistance to registration message replay (second variant only).
Note that S can detect such an attack by checking whether the H value
matches the current SSL/TLS session. If not, S simply discards the request.
It is very important to note that the mobile network operator possesses the
GAA bootstrapped session keys and must be trusted since, if it obtains the
authenticator8, it could perform a dictionary attack to find the user’s long-term
password. In practice, users already trust mobile operators not to intercept their
phone calls. This is a high level of trust since operators could, for example,
intercept and misuse a wide range of user secrets (e.g. credit card details).
5.2 Security-efficiency Trade-offs
In the pre-shared key approach outlined in section 3, a secret key is used in all
authentication sessions. This is arguably more efficient, since there is no need
8 A malicious mobile network provider could potentially set up a phishing website to
try to persuade a user to submit an authenticator. However, such a scenario seems
rather far-fetched, particularly given that a user can choose which network operator
to use.
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for session key establishment (e.g. a GAA procedure) in the user authentication
process. However, in a high security scenario it may be necessary to use a new key
for each authentication session. Secret key re-configuration is highly non-trivial
in the pre-shared key approach, since tokens have to be distributed to users.
As we show immediately below, the GAA-based approach has the flexibility to
enable security-efficiency tradeoffs.
For a high-security scenario in which a new session key SK is needed for each
authentication session, the basic GAA-based scheme can be used. By setting the
lifetime of MK to be sufficiently short, a new master MK will be established
between T and its home network in each authentication session. As a result, a
new session key SK will be derived for the computation of each user authen-
tication code. Of course, this will introduce a significant network traffic and
computational overhead, including the establishment of MK using the GAA
bootstrapping procedure, the derivation of the session key SK in T, and the
fetching of SK from the mobile network by S . Such an approach therefore has
relatively high security and low efficiency. In a scenario where security is not
quite such a high priority, one of the variant schemes can be used in which the
key SK is cached and used as a long-term key for multiple user authentication
sessions. As a result, additional GAA procedures and calculations are avoided,
and higher efficiency can be achieved.
6 Conclusions
SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication is a lightweight and effective coun-
termeasure to man in the middle attacks. We propose a means of implementing
SSL/TLS session-aware user authentication using a GAA bootstrapped key. The
scheme employs a GAA-enabled user device with a display and an input capa-
bility (e.g. a 3G mobile phone) and a GAA-aware server. Importantly, the user
device does not need to be registered with the server, and no server-specific de-
tails are stored in the device; that is, the user device is not specific to either the
user or the server. Analysis shows that the scheme is effective, secure, scalable
and has a degree of flexibility enabling security-efficiency trade-offs. Moreover,
the scheme fits well to the multi-institution scenario.
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